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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
  
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge:  
 
 Shortly after commencing his first term in office, U.S. 
Virgin Islands Governor John P. de Jongh, Jr., fired Claude 
S.M. Gerard and Charles Iles, two public employees in the 
Department of Planning and Natural Resources.  Both 
employees sued the Governor and the Government of the 
Virgin Islands, claiming that their terminations deprived them 
of their property interests in public employment without due 
process of law.  Following an evidentiary hearing, the District 
Court agreed and issued a preliminary injunction directing 
that Gerard and Iles be reinstated and that they be 
compensated for lost wages.  Governor de Jongh and the 
Government of the Virgin Islands appeal the order granting 
the preliminary injunction.  We will reverse. 
 
I. 
 
 In June 2004, then Governor Charles W. Turnbull 
signed two Notices of Personnel Action (“NOPA”) relevant 
to this case.  In one notice, he transferred Appellee Charles 
Iles from his previous government position to that of Permits 
Coordinator for the Division of Coastal Zone Management, 
within the Department of Planning and Natural Resources.  
The NOPA listed Iles’ new position as “exempt.”  Thereafter, 
Iles signed a letter addressed to the Acting Director, Division 
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of Personnel, which stated: 
 
  In accordance with Act 5336, Section 
6(c) and Section 8(a), I am electing to be placed 
in the EXEMPT SERVICE of the Government 
of the Virgin Islands by accepting the position 
of Permits Coordinator, Division of Coastal 
Zone Management at $43,000.00 per annum, in 
the DEPARTMENT OF PLANNING AND 
NATURAL RESOURCES. 
  This request is voluntary as certified by 
witness.  
 
 In the other notice, Governor Turnbull transferred 
Appellee Claude S.M. Gerard from his previous position to 
that of Assistant Director for the Division of Coastal Zone 
Management, within the Department of Planning and Natural 
Resources.  The NOPA also stated that Gerard’s position was 
“exempt.”  Gerard then signed a letter to the Acting Director, 
Division of Personnel that was identical to the one signed by 
Iles, except for its statement that Gerard’s new position was 
“Assistant Director, Division of Coastal Zone Management at 
$50,000.00 per annum.”  
 
 In January 2007, de Jongh succeeded Turnbull as 
Governor of the Virgin Islands.  Shortly after taking office, 
and without prior notice or a hearing, Governor de Jongh 
terminated both Gerard and Iles from further government 
service.  In a letter to Iles, he said: 
 
You are hereby advised that your services as 
Permits Coordinator of the Coastal Zone 
Management in the Department of Planning and 
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Natural Resources will no longer be necessary.  
Therefore, your employment with the 
Government of the Virgin Islands is terminated 
effective February 9, 2007.  
  
On behalf of the people of the Virgin Islands, I 
would like to thank you for your service.  I wish 
you the best in all your future endeavors.  
 
 Governor de Jongh also terminated Gerard, writing 
him the same letter he wrote to Iles, except for substituting 
the position of “Assistant Director” for “Permits 
Coordinator.”  
  
 Gerard and Iles filed complaints in the District Court 
for the Virgin Islands, alleging, among other things, that 
Governor de Jongh and the Government of the Virgin Islands 
had deprived them of their property interests in public 
employment without due process of law.  Thereafter, Gerard 
and Iles moved for a preliminary injunction seeking 
immediate reinstatement and back pay.  After an evidentiary 
hearing, the District Court granted Gerard’s and Iles’ motions 
for preliminary injunctions and ordered that Governor de 
Jongh reinstate Gerard and Iles to their prior positions.  The 
District Court also ordered that Gerard and Iles be 
compensated for the wages they would have otherwise 
received from the date of their termination to the date of their 
reinstatement.  Governor de Jongh and the Government filed 
appeals from the preliminary injunction.1
                                                 
1 We have jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal of a grant 
of a preliminary injunction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1292(a)(1). 
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II. 
 
A. 
 
 To determine whether to grant a preliminary 
injunction, “a district court must consider: (1) whether the 
movant has shown a reasonable probability of success on the 
merits; (2) whether the movant will be irreparably injured by 
denial of the relief; (3) whether granting preliminary relief 
will result in even greater harm to the nonmoving party; and 
(4) whether granting the preliminary relief will be in the 
public interest.”  McTernan v. City of York, 577 F.3d 521, 
526 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Bell, 414 F.3d 
474, 478 n.4 (3d Cir. 2005)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 
 Although this case comes to us from the appeal of the 
grant of a preliminary injunction, Governor de Jongh only 
challenges the District Court’s ruling as to the first element of 
the preliminary injunction standard—the likelihood of 
success on the merits of Gerard and Iles’ procedural due 
process claim.  
 
 We have explained that to establish a procedural due 
process claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that “(1) he was 
deprived of an individual interest that is encompassed within 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of life, liberty, or 
property, and (2) the procedures available to him did not 
provide due process of law.”  Biliski v. Red Clay Consol. 
School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 574 F.3d 214, 219 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(quoting Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 234 (3d 
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Cir. 2006)).2
 
  “The question of whether an employee has a 
property right in continued employment is a question of state 
[or territorial] law.”  McDaniels v. Flick, 59 F.3d 446, 458 
(3d Cir. 1995) (citing Board of Regents of State Colleges v. 
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)).  However, before 
determining whether Gerard and Iles have a property right in 
their employment under Virgin Islands law, it is helpful to 
examine the various statutory provisions governing public 
employment in the Virgin Islands.  Employee classifications 
contained in the statutory provisions are important because 
they determine which employees are entitled to due process 
protection before termination.   
B. 
 
 Beginning with the two broadest categories under 
Virgin Islands law, public employees are divided into (1) 
“career service” and (2) “exempt service” employees.  See 
Martinez-Sanes v. Turnbull, 318 F.3d 483, 487 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(“Thus, employees of the Virgin Islands are divided into two 
categories, the ‘[Career] Service’ entitled to Civil Service 
protection, and the ‘Exempt Service’ not so entitled.”).  The 
division between these two categories is set forth in 3 V.I.C. § 
451a(c), which provides that “[a]ll positions in the Executive 
Branch of the United States Virgin Islands Government not 
exempted under subsection (b) of this section shall be in the 
                                                 
2 In order to comport with due process, in cases where it is 
possible to conduct a pre-termination hearing, “[t]he tenured 
public employee is entitled to oral or written notice of the 
charges against him, an explanation of the employer’s 
evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of the story.” 
Biliski, 574 F.3d at 220.  
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career service.”  In other words, an employee is in the career 
service unless the employee holds an exempt position 
described in 3 V.I.C. § 451a(b)(1)-(8).  Because the parties 
agree that subsections (1) through (7) of § 451a(b) are not 
applicable here, we focus our analysis on subsection (8).  
Under subsection (8), an employee is exempt if he or she is: 
 
an officer or employee in a position of a policy-
determining nature when the position is so 
designated by the Governor and submitted to 
the Legislature; and an employee who is a 
special assistant, or who is on special 
assignment to, or whose position requires a 
confidential relationship with a policy-making 
official when the position is so designated by 
the Governor and submitted to the Legislature. 
 
(emphasis added).  Thus, a position is exempt and not in the 
career service category when the Governor designates it as a 
position of a “policy-determining nature” and it is submitted 
to the Legislature.  The exempt designation is important 
because employees in that category can be terminated without 
cause.  Employees who are not “exempt” are then considered 
“career service” employees. 
 
 The career service category is further divided by § 451 
into two subcategories: employees who are “regular” and 
those who are “not regular,” respectively.  Thus, the 
categories of career service employees and regular employees 
are not interchangeable.  Richardson v. Felix, 856 F.2d 505, 
509 (3d Cir. 1988).  As we explained in Richardson, a 
“regular” employee is one “who has been appointed to a 
position in the [career] service in accordance with this chapter 
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[relating to the Personnel Merit System] after completing his 
working test period.” Richardson, 856 F.2d at 509 (citing 3 
V.I.C. § 451 (1967)) (alterations in Richardson).  Therefore, a 
“career service” employee is also a “regular” employee only 
if he has been appointed to his position in accordance with the 
Personnel Merit System and has completed his probationary 
period.  
 
 Further, in interpreting Virgin Islands law, we have 
previously held that under the employee termination 
procedures of § 530, employees who are “regular employees” 
may be terminated only for cause, thus granting them “a 
property interest in continued employment.”  Id.; see also 
Martinez-Sanes, 318 F.3d at 489 (stating, in interpreting 
Virgin Islands law, that “[o]nly ‘regular’ employees had Civil 
Service Protection” and vacating injunction based on 
procedural due process claim, because plaintiff had not 
completed his probationary period as required by the 
definition of “regular” employee.) (emphasis added); 
Richardson, 856 F.2d at 511 n.8 (“As noted earlier in our 
discussion, section 530, the provision that makes regular 
employees terminable only for cause, also sets forth 
procedures for the termination of such employees.”) 
(emphasis added).  Accordingly, not all “career service” 
employees have due process protection, but rather, only those 
who also meet the definition of “regular” employees.  
 
C. 
 
 In the case before us, the District Court explained that 
under § 451a(b)(8), regardless of whether Gerard and Iles 
were in positions designated as policy-determining in nature, 
the Governor had not submitted those designated positions to 
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the Legislature, as required for any “exempt” employee under 
§ 451a(b)(8).  
 
 Governor de Jongh argues that the District Court 
incorrectly concluded that the Governor must submit these 
designations to the Legislature before employees in those 
positions can become “exempt.”  It is true that in Martinez-
Sanes, when determining whether an employee was in the 
“exempt service” under § 451a(b)(8), we focused exclusively 
on the fact-intensive question of whether a given employee 
was in a position of a policy-determining nature.  318 F.3d at 
488-90.  We did not analyze whether the employee’s position 
had been designated as “exempt” by the Governor and 
submitted to the Legislature.  However, in 1999 when the 
suits in Martinez-Sanes were filed, § 451a(b)(8) did not 
include the current language requiring that a “position of a 
policy-determining nature” be “so designated by the 
Governor and submitted to the Legislature” before it could 
become an “exempt” position.  In Martinez-Sanes, this Court 
relied on the pre-2000 version of § 451a(b)(8), which stated 
that “exempt” employees include: 
 
[a]n officer or employee in a position of a 
policy-determining nature; employee who is a 
special assistant, or who is on special 
assignment to, or whose position requires a 
confidential relationship with a policy-making 
official when the position is so designated by 
the Governor and submitted to the Legislature. 
  
318 F.3d at 487 (quoting the pre-2000 version of § 
451a(b)(8)).  Notably, the first clause regarding “position[s] 
of a policy-determining nature” is separated from the rest of 
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the subsection by a semicolon, thus indicating that the later 
modifier “when the position is so designated by the Governor 
and submitted to the Legislature” does not modify this first 
clause, as it does the remaining clauses in the subsection.  The 
current language, however, makes “exempt”: 
 
an officer or employee in a position of a policy-
determining nature when the position is so 
designated by the Governor and submitted to 
the Legislature; and an employee who is a 
special assistant, or who is on special 
assignment to, or whose position requires a 
confidential relationship with a policy-making 
official when the position is so designated by 
the Governor and submitted to the Legislature. 
 
(emphasis added).  This change in the language of § 
451a(b)(8), which extends the designation and submission 
requirements to those employees in positions of a policy-
determining nature, was created by a 2000 amendment to § 
451a.  In light of this intervening change in the language of § 
451a, Martinez-Sanes can no longer be relied on to support 
the position that Governor de Jongh advocates.  
 
 Governor de Jongh argues that even if § 451a(b)(8) 
does require that all positions of a policy-determining nature 
be designated as such and “submitted to the Legislature,” 
testimony at the District Court hearing established that both 
Gerard’s and Iles’ designated positions were submitted to the 
Legislature.  However, we have reviewed the pages in the 
Joint Appendix where this testimony allegedly occurred and 
find no evidence to support the claims made by Governor de 
Jongh.  (De Jongh Brief, at 14-15, citing JA, at 157-204).  On 
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page 15, in footnote 2 of his brief, de Jongh also cites to 
Gerard’s “trial” transcript to support his claim of evidence 
that the designations were submitted to the Legislature.  
Although this transcript was not included in the Joint 
Appendix, we have obtained a copy and have considered it.  
After reviewing the testimony of Milton E. Potter, Assistant 
Director for the Division of Personnel for the Virgin Islands 
Government, we agree with the District Court that de Jongh 
has not shown that Gerard and Iles were “designated [as 
being in a position of a policy-determining nature] by the 
Governor and submitted to the Legislature.”  3 V.I.C. § 
451a(b)(8).   
 
 The Governor further argues that the District Court 
broke off the evidentiary hearing despite his insistence that he 
be permitted to present additional evidence.  Again, however, 
nowhere in the record is there any indication that Governor de 
Jongh’s counsel wished to continue the hearing or proffer 
additional evidence.  Indeed, just before the hearing ended, 
Governor de Jongh’s counsel told the District Court: “Your 
Honor, [the] Government rests.”  (JA, at 202). 
 
 Accordingly, after determining that there was no 
evidence to suggest that Gerard or Iles’ designated positions 
had been submitted to the Legislature, the District Court did 
not err when it found that neither Gerard nor Iles occupied an 
exempt position.  Thus, because by definition “[a]ll positions 
in the Executive Branch of the United States Virgin Islands 
Government not exempted . . . shall be in the career 
service[,]” 3 V.I.C. § 451a(c), the District Court correctly 
found that Gerard and Iles were career service employees. 
 
D. 
 
 13 
 
 As previously noted, merely because a Virgin Islands 
public employee is part of the “career service” does not 
necessarily mean that he is also a “regular” employee with a 
property interest entitled to due process protection.  In this 
regard, the District Court erred by conflating “career service” 
employees with “regular” employees.  To be a “regular” 
employee and thus gain a property interest in employment, an 
employee must have been “appointed to a position in the 
[career] service in accordance with this chapter after 
completing his working test period.” 3 V.I.C.§ 451.  “[T]his 
chapter” refers to Title 3, Chapter 25 of the Virgin Islands 
Code, which in addition to §§ 451 and 451a, also includes 
Sections 521 through 535.  These sections set forth the 
standards and requirements for “tests, appointments, 
promotions, and dismissals” of “regular” public employees.  
Under Section 521, to have been “appointed to a position in 
the [career] service in accordance with this chapter” requires 
that an employee have been appointed “on the basis of merit 
and fitness, to be ascertained by competitive examinations.” 3 
V.I.C. § 521. 
 
Here, the District Court found that neither Gerard nor 
Iles had shown that they were appointed “on the basis of 
merit and fitness, . . . [as] ascertained by competitive 
examination.” (JA, at 11) (quoting 3 V.I.C. § 521).  Nor is 
there anything in the record to suggest that Gerard or Iles was 
ever appointed in accordance with Chapter 25 as is required 
to become a “regular” employee.  Thus, although Gerard and 
Iles were “career service” employees, they were not “regular” 
employees under the plain language of 3 V.I.C.§ 451.3
                                                 
3 Although, when interpreting identical statutory language in 
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 Gerard and Iles also contend, however, that a 2010 
amendment to § 530 applies in this case, and that the 
amendment removes the requirement that a “regular” 
employee have been appointed in accordance with the 
requirements of Chapter 25 of the Virgin Islands Code, 
including the competitive merit provisions.  Whether the 
amended definition of a “regular” employee applies to Gerard 
and Iles depends on an analysis under Landgraf v. USI Film 
Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994), which sets forth the following 
two-part test for determining whether a statute enacted after 
the events of a suit nevertheless applies to that suit: 
 
 When a case implicates a federal statute 
enacted after the events in suit, the court’s first 
task is to determine whether Congress has 
expressly prescribed the statute’s proper reach. 
If Congress has done so, of course, there is no 
need to resort to judicial default rules. When, 
however, the statute contains no such express 
command, the court must determine whether the 
new statute would have retroactive effect, i.e., 
whether it would impair rights a party possessed 
when he acted, increase a party's liability for 
past conduct, or impose new duties with respect 
to transactions already completed. If the statute 
                                                                                                                                                             
Richardson, we found that the plaintiff was a regular 
employee merely by virtue of having been employed for more 
than a year, the majority opinion in that case simply did not 
address the additional requirement of § 451 that the employee 
have been appointed in accordance with the requirements of 
the Personnel Merit System. 
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would operate retroactively, our traditional 
presumption teaches that it does not govern 
absent clear congressional intent favoring such 
a result. 
 
  Id. at 280. 
 
 At the first step, we determine that there is nothing in 
the language of the 2010 amendment that indicates that the 
Virgin Islands Legislature “expressly prescribed” that its new 
definition of a “regular” employee should apply to cases 
pending at the time of its enactment.  Because we discern no 
such express command, we next determine whether the 
amendment would have a “retroactive effect” if applied to 
Gerard and Iles.  If it would have such a retroactive effect, 
then the traditional presumption directs that it would not 
govern Gerard and Iles’s claims, given the absence of clear 
congressional intent to the contrary.   
 
 Landgraf teaches that a statute has “retroactive effect” 
when “it would impair rights a party possessed when he 
acted, increase a party’s liability for past conduct, or impose 
new duties with respect to transactions already completed.”  
Id.  Here, applying the new definition of a “regular” 
employee to Gerard and Iles would both expand de Jongh’s 
liability for past conduct and impose new duties on de Jongh 
with respect to completed transactions by requiring him to 
reinstate Gerard and Iles, provide them with notice and a 
hearing, and make a showing of cause before terminating 
them.  Moreover, applying the new definition of a “regular” 
employee to Gerard and Iles would conflict with 
“considerations of fair notice [to de Jongh]” and frustrate de 
Jongh’s “reasonable reliance [on the existing statute], and 
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settled expectations . . .” that he was permitted to terminate 
Gerard and Iles without cause or a hearing.  Id. at 270.  All of 
these considerations “offer sound guidance” that the 
amendment, if applied to Gerard and Iles, would have a 
retroactive effect.  Id.  Because the Virgin Islands Legislature 
has not expressly stated that the amendment to § 530 should 
apply to suits arising before it was enacted, and because we 
find that that the amendment would have a “retroactive 
effect” under Landgraf, the traditional presumption that the 
amendment does not govern applies.  Instead, we review the 
claims of Gerard and Iles under the definition of a “regular” 
employee that existed at the time their suit arose.  
Accordingly, because Gerard and Iles are not “regular” 
employees under that definition, as we previously explained, 
they lack a due process property interest in their employment. 
 
E. 
 
 Although we vacate the preliminary injunction, we 
nevertheless find that, even had we affirmed the injunction, 
the District Court’s award of back pay to Gerard and Iles 
would have been erroneous as a matter of law.  The District 
Court concluded that under § 1983, Governor de Jongh could 
be sued in his official capacity for back pay.  In reaching this 
conclusion, it relied on our previous statement that the 
remedy of reinstatement and the accompanying restoration of 
back pay generally constitutes a form of injunctive relief.  
Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 626 F.2d 1115, 1122 (3d Cir. 1980).  
It also relied on language in Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State 
Police, which provided that “a state official in his or her 
official capacity, when sued for injunctive relief, would be a 
person under § 1983 . . .”  491 U.S. 58, 71 & n.10 (1989).   
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 The District Court appears to have taken the language 
in Will to permit a public official to be sued in his official 
capacity under § 1983 for all injunctive relief, rather than 
merely for prospective injunctive relief.  However, Will 
makes clear that a state employee may be sued in his official 
capacity only for “prospective” injunctive relief, because 
“official-capacity actions for prospective relief are not treated 
as actions against the State.” Id. at n.10. (quoting Kentucky v. 
Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n.14 (1985); Ex parte Young, 209 
U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908)).  We have previously upheld this 
key distinction, affirming the dismissal of § 1983 claims for 
past wages even when presented as claims for “injunctive 
relief,” because those claims were retrospective rather than 
prospective.  See, e.g., McCauley v. Univ. of the Virgin 
Islands, 618 F.3d 232, 240-41 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that, 
under § 1983, plaintiffs “cannot seek money damages” but 
can “seek prospective injunctive relief” against University of 
the Virgin Islands personnel in their official capacities); Brow 
v. Farrelly, 994 F.2d 1027, 1037 & n.12 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(upholding dismissal of claim for “injunctive” relief, 
including past wages and benefits, because it “was essentially 
a claim for retrospective damages . . . and thus not actionable 
against territorial officials in their official capacities under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983”). 
 
 Accordingly, the District Court’s award of back pay, 
although injunctive in nature, is impermissible retrospective 
relief and would be reversed even had we affirmed the 
preliminary injunction.  
 
III. 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the decision of 
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the District Court, vacate the preliminary injunction, and 
remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this 
opinion. 
